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Pretrial Drug Testing: An Essential Step 
in Bail Reform 
John A. Carver* 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
On March 5, 1984, a press conference was held in a 
conference room of the District of Columbia Superior Court. 
Before a small group of reporters, a photographer or two, and a 
camera crew, Chief Judge H. Carl Moultrie, I. announced a 
new program of on-site drug testing. Funded with a grant from 
the National Institute of Justice to the District of Columbia 
Pretrial Services Agency, the program was essentially a 
research project, designed to produce studies on the 
relationship between drug use and criminal behavior. With the 
latest in drug testing technology installed in a laboratory in the 
John A. Carver III, Esq. Mr. Carver is the Director of the District of 
Columbia Pretrial Services Agency, one of the oldest and largest such programs in 
the country. 
A 1967 graduate of the University of Wisconsin, Mr. Carver served with the 
Peace Corps in Bolivia for three years. He received his J.D. from Georgetown 
University Law Center in 1974, and is a member of the Bars of the District of 
Columbia and Virginia. 
Mr. Carver has been active in the field of pretrial services both nationally and 
in the District of Columbia. He is a past president of the National Association of 
Pretrial Services Agencies, the current President of the Mid-Atlantic Pretrial 
Services Association, and a member of the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA. 
The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency, which Mr. Carter heads, has achieved a 
national reputation for excellence. It serves as a neutral information source for 
judicial officers, both local and federal, in the courts of the District of Columbia. 
After interviewing and investigating the background of the persons charged with 
criminal offenses, it recommends nonfinancial release alternatives designed to 
assure appearance in court and community safety. Awarded the Department of 
Justice's designation as an "Enhanced Pretrial Services Program," the Pretrial 
Services Agency has frequently served as a model for criminal justice 
administrators in other jurisdictions. 
Eight years ago, the agency set up a comprehensive program of pretrial drug 
screening of all arrestees--the first of its kind in the country. Based on the 
success of this program, the Department of Justice sponsored a replication effort in 
other jurisdictions. 
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courthouse, the program planned to collect urine specimens 
from each arrestee, analyze them, and report the results to the 
judge or hearing commissioner in "arraignment" court. 
Following the press conference, a single article 1 appeared 
in the Washington Post describing the research aims of the new 
program, and including a photograph of the chemical analyzer 
purchased for the new program. Beyond that, there was little 
fanfare because the District of Columbia had been drug testing 
arrestees since 1970.2 While law enforcement officials were 
concerned about the rise in drug-related crime, drug use was 
not yet perceived to be a national problem. 
The apathy surrounding this announcement did not last 
long. Within a week, the test results documented the existence 
of a serious and virtually unrecognized problem of extensive 
phencyclidine (PCP) use among the arrestee population. 3 
Figures compiled after the second week of testing confirmed 
these findings. 4 At about the same time, a series of articles in 
the Washington Post described, in lurid detail, the effects of 
PCP on some individuals. 5 For the first time, general concerns 
about drug use and crime could now be quantified and tracked 
with objective data - arrestee test results - summarized at 
the end of each month and distributed to an ever-growing list 
of public officials and interested persons. The District of 
Columbia, through its drug testing program, was able to 
document first the PCP epidemic of the mid-eighties, and then 
the rise of cocaine use, accelerated by the advent of "crack" 
Ed Bruske, D.C. Court Officials Start Defendants' Drug Tests, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 6, 1984, at Bl. 
2 Judge Harold H. Greene, then Chief Judge of the Court of General 
Sessions, issued an order in 1970 permitting officials from the City's Narcotics 
Treatment Agency to conduct testing of arrestees in the cell block of the 
courthouse. Based on the test results, releasees could be referred to drug 
treatment. Although in continuous operation since 1970, by 1984 testing was quite 
limited and sporadic. 
3 Memorandum from Bruce D. Beaudin, Director of the D.C. Pretrial Services 
Agency to the Honorable H. Carl Moultrie, I. (March 13, 1984) (on file with 
author). The memo stated that "drug use among adult criminal arrestees was 
substantially higher than anticipated," at 61% of those tested. The percentage that 
tested positive for PCP was 33%. 
4 Memorandum to Ernest Hardaway II, M.D., from Bruce D. Beaudin (March 
19, 1984) (on file with author). 
5 Ronald Kessler, Producing Hallucinogenic Drug Brought Profits and Risks, 
Chemist Says, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1984, at A9. Ronald Kessler and Alfred E. 
Lewis, Police See Use of PCP Rising at Rapid Rate, WASIL POST, Mar. 10, 1984, at 
Al. Linda Wheeler, A Life Lived in the Shadow of PCP, WASIL PoST, Mar. 11, 
1984, at Al. 
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several years later. The latest arrestee drug tests were 
frequently cited by public officials and reported in both the 
local and national press. 
The rest of the story is well known. The cocaine overdose 
death of Len Bias on June 19, 19866 profoundly affected the 
way in which the American public came to see drug abuse. By 
the time the 1988 election rolled around, the drug epidemic 
was consistently identified as a major problem facing the 
country. 7 During the early months of the Bush administration, 
a "Drug Czar" was appointed to direct the latest "drug war." 
The President went on television, armed with a bag of crack 
seized by the DEA in a staged drug buy in front of the White 
House, declaring the drug war to be the nation's highest 
priority. Mter the speech, there was an eight fold increase in 
news coverage of drug issues, according to the Center for Media 
and Public Mfairs. 8 
Meanwhile, officials in the Justice Department, impressed 
by the success of the District of Columbia's drug testing 
program, initiated several related projects. The research arm of 
the Department, the National Institute of Justice, announced 
the Drug Use Forecasting program, or ''DUF", which was 
designed to sample arrestee drug use on a quarterly basis from 
a cross section of American cities. The state and local 
assistance arm of the Department, the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, set aside several million dollars in discretionary 
funding to see if the idea of pretrial drug testing could be 
replicated in other jurisdictions. When the White House issued 
the first National Drug Control Strategy, drug testing 
throughout the criminal justice system was an important 
component.9 Congress enacted legislation for the federal court 
Keith Harriston and Sally Jenkins, Maryland Basketball Star Len Bias is 
Dead at 22. Evidence of Cocaine Reported Found, WASH. PosT, June 20, 1986, at 
Al. 
By 1989, a Washington Post-ABC News Poll indicated that public concern 
about illicit drugs had doubled in recent months, with 44% of those interviewed 
ranking drugs as the country's most serious problem. Among black Americans, 
seven out of ten said drugs were the most serious problem facing the nation. L.A. 
TIMES, August 23, 1989, pt. 1, at 2. 
8 Paul M. Barrett, Moving On: Though the Drug War Isn't Over, Spotlight 
Turns to Other Issues. Departing Drug Czar Bennett Considers His Job Done; 
Progress but No Victory, WALL ST. J, November 19, 1990, at Al. 
9 THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 26 (1989). 
Probation, like parole, court-supervised treatment, and some release 
programs, should be tied to a regular and rigorous program of drug 
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system, establishing demonstration programs of mandatory 
pretrial drug testing in eight federal districts. 1° Finally, the 
Administration introduced legislation requiring states to 
implement criminal justice drug testing as a prerequisite for 
receiving block grant assistance funds. 11 
In contrast to the enthusiasm with which pretrial drug 
testing was embraced by the Reagan Justice Department, the 
reception within the community of pretrial services 
practitioners was mixed. At annual conferences of the National 
Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, there was 
considerable debate on a variety of related issues: the policy 
implications of research studies; the proper role of pretrial 
services agencies; and questions about whether drug testing 
advocates had simply been caught up in the ''hysteria" of the 
drug wars at the expense of the traditional goals of the bail 
reform movement. Fundamental values were questioned and 
fears were expressed about the direction of pretrial services. 
This article takes the position that pretrial drug testing is 
consistent with - indeed an essential component of - the 
principles of the bail reform movement as developed and 
refmed over the past quarter century. Section II discusses the 
development of the bail system, its adoption and modification 
in the United States, and twentieth century efforts to reform it. 
Section III describes a "model system" of pretrial justice, as set 
forth by the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies, 
the American Bar Association, and other commentators. 
Section IV turns to the drug issue, summarizing what we know 
about drug addiction, the relationship between drug addiction 
and criminal behavior, and the implications of this body of 
!d. 
testing in order to coerce offenders to abstain from drugs while 
integrating them back into the community. Such programs make prison 
space available for those drug offenders we cannot safely return to the 
streets. But unless they rigidly enforce drug abstinence under the threat 
of incarceration, these efforts lose their teeth. Drug tests should be part 
of every stage of the criminal justice process-at the time of arrest and 
throughout the period of probation or incarceration, and parole-because 
they are the most effective way of keeping offenders off drugs both in 
and out of detention. 
10 Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VII, § 7304, 102 Stat. 4464, Nov. 18, 1988. For a 
description of the experience of these federal demonstration programs, see 
ADMINISI'RATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FINAL REPORT: THE 
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM OF MANDATORY DRUG TESTING OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
(1991). 
11 S. 635, 102d Congress, 1st Session (1991). 
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knowledge for criminal justice practitioners. Section V 
integrates the reality of drug abuse with the principles of a 
model system of pretrial justice. The concluding section sets 
forth a few thoughts on future directions for pretrial services. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE BAIL SYSTEM 
To understand pretrial drug testing, one must first 
understand the role of pretrial services agencies and the 
context in which they developed. The first programs were 
started as social experiments in the mid 1960s, dedicated to 
nothing less than overhauling the bail system. Bail - defined 
as "the mechanism by which the defendant's right to freedom 
prior to trial is squared with society's interest in the smooth 
administration of criminal justice"12 - was seen as an unjust 
and inefficient system, operating most harshly against the least 
advantaged. The early experiments, such as the Manhattan 
Bail Project and the D.C. Bail Project were very much part of 
an effort by criminal justice reformers to change the bail 
system and eliminate (or at least reduce) the inequities 
inherent in it. The discriminatory aspects of the bail system 
had already been well chronicled, both in this country, and 
throughout the history of the English common law. 13 
The bail system dates back to medieval England.14 It 
developed from the ancient Anglo-Saxon forms of sureties. At 
that time, individuals charged with crimes were the 
responsibility of the Sheriff until a trial could be held by a 
judge who appeared from time to time "riding circuit." The 
Sheriff, as the local representative of the Crown, had authority 
to release the defendant to someone willing to stand as "surety" 
12 WAYNE THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 12 (1976). 
13 In a frequently cited article in the University of Pennsylvania Law review, 
Professor Caleb Foote describes the early history of abuse in the bail system: 
Recognition of the importance of bail in order to avoid pretrial 
imprisonment was a central theme in the long struggle to implement the 
promise of the famous 39th chapter of Magna Carta that "no freeman 
shall be arrested, or detained in prison ... unless ... by the law of the 
land." It is significant that three of the most critical steps in this 
process--the Petition of Right in 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and 
the Bill of Rights of 1689--grew out of cases which alleged abusive denial 
of freedom on bail pending trial. 
Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 
965-966 (1965) (citations omitted). 
14 For a good, general description of the origins of bail, see THOMAS, supra 
note 12. 
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or personal guarantor that the defendant would appear for 
trial. If the defendant did not appear, the personal surety was 
literally liable for whatever punishment might be due the 
defendant if the surety could not produce the defendant for 
trial. Thus, the system was one of personal guarantees, where 
a respected member of the community took on the 
responsibility to "stand in the shoes" of the defendant in the 
event that the defendant absconded. 
It was this system that was brought to Colonial America. 
It persisted well into the 19th century at which time it began 
to take on a uniquely American character. The system 
gradually evolved to reflect the changes in social structure in 
American life. As opposed to a feudal society, the young nation 
was mobile and expansionist in nature. Eventually, the system 
of personal sureties was replaced by one of commercial 
guarantees. Rather than being personally responsible for the 
defendant's punishment, the surety could now be required to 
forfeit a sum of money. From this change evolved the system of 
compensated sureties for profit that we know today. It should 
be pointed out, however, that of all the former Commonwealth 
countries, only the United States has a commercial system of 
bail bonds. 
This evolution from a personal system to a commercial 
system was accompanied by persistent but largely ignored 
criticisms. 15 These criticisms encompassed several themes. To 
the extent that an individual's pretrial freedom was a function 
of his ability to pay a bondsman, critics charged that it 
discriminated against the poor. By the same token, to the 
extent the system permitted the release of more wealthy 
defendants, it did not adequately address other concerns of the 
16 For general information on early criticisms of the bail system, see JOHN S. 
GoLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. Go'ITFREDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR BAIL: AN 
EXPERIMENT IN COURT REFORM (1985); THOMAS, supra note 12. See also Leary v. 
United States, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912) (noting that the bondsman's "interest to 
produce the body of the principal in court is impersonal and wholly pecuniary."). 
Underscoring the fact that little has changed in the 80 years since this observation 
was made in 1912 is an article in the Washington Post describing the recent 
crackdown in collecting bond forfeitures in the District of Columbia: "'On a $10,000 
bond, I can ask for $11,000,' Williams [a bondsman] said, 'if he doesn't show, the 
court gets the $10,000, and I keep my $1,000.' Otherwise, the client gets $10,000 
back. That may reduce the bondsman's incentive to hound the client into court, but 
in a high-risk, low-yield business, it's a safer bet than trying to collect a bond-
jumper's car." Alison Howard, Crime Rise No Bonanza for Bondsmen: Unpaid Bail 
Forfeitures, Disappearing Clients Plague D. C. Courthouse Businessmen, WASH. POST, 
October 5, 1991, at Cl. 
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justice system, such as the likelihood that the defendant would 
appear in court. In a classic 1927 study of bail practices in 
Cook County, Illinois, Arthur Beeley condemned the bail 
system, writing: "The Present system . . . neither guarantees 
security to society nor safeguards the rights of the accused. [It 
is] lax with those with whom it should be stringent and 
stringent with those with whom it should be less severe."16 
Forty years later, little had changed. In an influential article 
Professor Caleb Foote echoed earlier criticisms, arguing that 
"such discrimination against the poor cannot survive in its 
present blatant form.'m Citing studies of the bail system in 
Philadelphia and New York in the late 1950's, as well as 
several other studies in the early 1960's, commentators wrote: 
These probes disclosed the dismal picture of a system which 
trades freedom for money. Each year, in federal and state 
courts, thousands of persons were held in jail for weeks or 
months awaiting trial solely because they could not raise 
money to pay bondsmen. Even when low bail of $500 or 
$1,000 was set, a $50 or $100 bond premium was more than 
many defendants could afford. Left behind in the wake of 
detention were lost jobs, abandoned homes, families destitute 
and without support, lawyers hobbled in preparing cases for 
trial. The chances for acquittal, or for probation if convicted, 
diminished. Dead time in jail awaiting trial sometimes 
exceeded sentence after conviction, and often was ignored in 
the computation of jail terms. 18 
Another theme was the way in which the bail bond system 
resulted in a transfer of control over the release process from 
the judiciary to private individuals. In a Supreme Court case 
upholding the Illinois Ten Percent Cash Bail System, Mr. 
Justice Blackmun wrote: 
Prior to 1964 the professional bail bondsman system with all 
its abuses was in full and odorous bloom in Illinois. Under 
that system, the bail bondsman customarily collected the 
maximum fee (10% of the amount of the bond) permitted by 
statute, and retained that entire amount even though the 
accused fully satisfied the conditions of the bond. Payment of 
16 ARTHUR BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1966). 
17 Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 
959, 999 (1965). 
18 Patricia M. Wald & Daniel J. Freed, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: A 
Practitioner's Primer, 52 A.B.A.J. 940-41 (1966). 
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this substantial "premium" was required of the good risk as 
well as of the bad. The results were that a heavy and 
irretrievable burden fell upon the accused, to the excellent 
profit of the bondsman, and that professional bondsmen, and 
not the courts, exercised significant control over the actual 
workings of the bail system. 19 
In his dissenting opinion m the same case, Mr. Justice 
Douglas noted that: 
The commercial bail bondsman has long been an anathema to 
the criminal defendant seeking to exercise his right to pretrial 
release. In theory, the courts were to set such amounts and 
conditions of bonds as were necessary to secure the 
appearance of defendants at trial. Those who did not have the 
resources to post their own bond were at the mercy of the 
bondsman who could exact exorbitant fees and unconscionable 
conditions for acting as surety. Criminal defendants often 
paid more in fees to bondsmen for securing their release than 
they were later to pay in penalties for their crime.~0 
In a noted case from the D.C. Circuit, Judge Bazelon 
observed that the defendant may have no real financial stake 
in appearing in court, since it is the bondsman that decides 
whether to require collateral, and the court does not decide, or 
even know, if a given bond means a greater stake and a greater 
incentive not to flee.21 Under the old system of personal 
sureties, the surety's standing up for a defendant was seen as 
testimonial to the defendant's good character. However, a 
commercial bail bondsman may prefer the repeat business of a 
career criminal, as long as he pays his fees and shows up for 
trial. 
These were the practices that the early bail reforms set out 
to change. The first "experiments," viewed as revolutionary at 
the time, seem quaintly modest in retrospect. The bail projects 
of the mid 1960's set out to test a simple hypothesis-that some 
defendants could be released and would return to court without 
the payment of a bondsman's premium. Not surprisingly, the 
hypothesis was borne out. Statistics indicated that defendants 
released through the intervention of bail projects were just as 
19 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359-60 (1971) (citation omitted). 
20 ld. at 373-74 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
21 Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 701-02 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Bazelon, J., 
dissenting). 
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likely to appear in court as were defendants released after 
payment of bond.22 
The bail reform movement received a boost when the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Vera Foundation co-sponsored 
the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice in 1964 
for the purpose of focusing "nationwide attention on the defects 
in the bail system, the success of experiments in improving it, 
and the problems remaining in its reform."23 Convened by 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, with an opening address 
by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the conference "for the first time 
exposed the scope and depth of the bail problem to a national 
audience of over 400 judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, 
police, bondsmen, and prison officials."24 
As a direct outgrowth of the National Bail Conference, 
Congress added to the momentum of reform by passing 
sweeping legislation for the federal system known as the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966.25 This law created a presumption in favor 
of release on the least restrictive conditions reasonably 
calculated to assure the defendant's appearance in court. The 
impact of the new federal bail statute was significant. The 
language of the law served as a model, as many states set 
about to amend and reform their own bail statutes. 
The 1966 Bail Reform Act was not without its critics, 
however. A number of commentators believed that the single 
purpose of the new act - to assure appearance in court - was 
too limited. "Crime on bail" was perceived to be a growing 
problem, and some believed that protection of public safety 
should be an explicit purpose of "bail."26 Adherents of this 
22 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PUB. No. R0016, AN EVALUATION 
OF POLICY RELATED RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 
PROGRAMS (1975). 
23 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Letter of Transmittal introducing PROCEEDINGS 
AND INTERIM REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE at iv (U.S. Dep't of Justice & The Vera Foundation, co-sponsors, 1965) 
(hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. 
24 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 23, at xiv. 
25 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-46 (1988). 
26 Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in a hearing before the Subcommittee 
stated: 
Since its enactment, the Bail Reform Act has proved to be a great step 
forward in Federal criminal procedure. Notwithstanding these 
improvements, the act has not fully accomplished the purposes for which 
it was designed .... One major problem is that the provisions of the act 
which restrict the imposition of money bail and which require that any 
380 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 5 
position argued that public safety was in fact a consideration in 
every release decision, and that the law should, therefore, 
permit the Court to consider it openly - either through the use 
of restrictive release conditions or by outright "preventive 
detention." While attempts to amend the Federal Bail Reform 
Act in 1968 failed, these concepts were incorporated into the 
District of Columbia criminal code two years later. Thus, the 
District of Columbia became the first jurisdiction with a 
statutory procedure for detaining without bond certain 
defendants believed to pose threats to community safety. 
Significantly, the new bail/detention statute retained the 
"presumption in favor of release" that was the hallmark of the 
Federal Bail Reform Act. 
Presently, in the District of Columbia, to hold a defendant 
under "preventive detention," several specific judicial findings 
are required. One key finding is that no condition or 
combination of conditions will reasonably assure community 
safety.27 Thus, even if a defendant is found, based on past 
behavior, to pose a threat to community safety, release is still 
required unless the Court makes a specific, written, and 
appealable finding that no conditions can be imposed to protect 
the community. This concept - that even demonstrably 
"dangerous" defendants are entitled to pretrial release if their 
release can be safely supervised- is important to the position 
of this article, that drug testing is an essential component in 
completing the bail reform effort begun a generation ago. 
Although controversial, the constitutionality of the 
detention statute was eventually upheld by the D.C. Court of 
Appeals. 28 Within 15 years, many states had adopted 
amendments to their own bail laws permitting judges to 
pretrial detention be justified in writing by the judicial officer as 
necessary to prevent flight to avoid prosecution have resulted in the 
release of many allegedly dangerous defendants who previously could have 
been detained extra-legally by setting high money bail. This has led many 
persons to suggest that the act be amended to authorize expressly the 
outright detention of defendants considered to represent a high risk of 
further criminal conduct, as well as those considered to represent a high 
risk of flight. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT m' 1966, REPORT OF HEARINGS BEFORE 
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY, UNITED STATES SENATE, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969). 
27 D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1991). 
28 United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. dented, 455 U.S. 
1022 (1982). 
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consider community safety in bail determinations. In 1984, 
Congress passed sweeping amendments to the federal bail laws 
in the new Bail Reform Act of 1984.29 The Constitutionality of 
this law was upheld by the Supreme Court three years later in 
the case of United States v. Salerno. 30 
Ill. A ''MODEL" SYSTEM OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
Encouraged by their initial successes, the early bail 
reformers set about to institutionalize and complete the 
revolution they had begun. Program directors and 
administrators representing a wide diversity of pretrial reform 
efforts organized themselves into the first professional 
association, the National Association of Pretrial Services 
Agencies, in 1972.31 At this point, the concept of pretrial 
services was still in the formative stages. The early "pioneers" 
of the movement represented a wide diversity of programs, 
whose only common denominator seemed to be a willingness to 
try anything to make the pretrial phase of the criminal justice 
system work better. 
Gradually, the field began to coalesce around a set of 
principles and beliefs regarding the way pretrial defendants 
should be "processed" through the criminal justice system. A 
number of criminal justice groups undertook projects to develop 
"standards" for different aspects of the justice system.32 In 
1976, The National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies 
(NAPSA), with financial support from the U.S. Department of 
Justice, initiated a two year project to develop "standards and 
goals" for pretrial release programs and pretrial diversion 
programs. Working independently, the American Bar 
Association also developed criminal justice standards for 
pretrial release incorporating many of the same principles.33 
29 
30 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-46 (1988). 
107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). 
31 Program directors at the first meetings of the National Association of 
Pretrial Services Agencies represented VISTA volunteers, anti-poverty programs 
funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, church groups, revolving bail funds, 
pretrial diversion programs, programs dedicated to fmding jobs for defendants, 
"own recognizance" programs, and heroin addiction treatment programs. Conference 
Proceedings of the First Annual Conference of the National Association of Pretrial 
Services Agencies (March 14-16, 1973) (on file with author). 
32 Among the organizations producing standards were the National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice, the American Bar Association, and the National 
District Attorneys Association. 
33 For a comparison of these two sets of standards, see RoSEANNA KAPLAN, 
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These two sets of standards were intended to represent an 
"ideal" system of pretrial release decision-making. 
In formulating standards for pretrial release, both the ABA 
and NAPSA adopted the view that public safety is a factor in 
almost every release decision (whether or not articulated) and 
that therefore the consideration of this factor should be open 
and governed by strict procedural safeguards. A "model" 
system, then, would permit public danger to be considered 
explicitly, but end the use of money bonds as the means for 
accomplishing "sub rosa" preventive detention.34 Briefly, then, 
a model system of pretrial justice begins with a presumption in 
favor of pretrial release.35 The presumption in favor of release 
on personal recognizance must be overcome in order to impose 
restrictive conditions of release.36 If conditions of release are 
to be imposed, they must be the least restrictive conditions 
required to assure the appearance of the defendant or protect 
the safety of the community.37 In determining conditions of 
release, the court should follow an ordered progression, from 
least restrictive conditions for "low risk" individuals to more 
restrictive conditions for higher risk individuals. Even 
defendants with prior convictions for dangerous acts are 
entitled to pretrial liberty if conditions can be imposed which 
will reasonably assure the safety to the community. For the 
cases posing the highest potential risk, such conditions might 
well include placement in a halfway house, regular drug 
monitoring, and participation in a drug treatment program. 
One of the cornerstones of the "model" system of pretrial 
decision-making is the abolition of the use of monetary 
PRETRIAL SERVICES RESOURCE CENTER, A COMPARISON OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 
STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES (1983). 
34 
"Sub rosa" preventive detention refers to the practice of setting a high bond 
ostensibly to assure return to court, but in reality to detain the defendant. 
35 See PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND GoALS FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard 
I (National Assoc. of Pretrial Services Agencies 1978) [hereinafter NAPSA RELEASE 
STANDARDS]. See also STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, Standard 10-1.1. (American Bar Association 1980) [herinafter ABA 
STANDARDS]. 
36 NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard IV. 
37 Although adopted in 1978, long before drug testing gained popularity as a 
monitoring technique, the NAPSA Release Standards specifically mentioned, by way 
of example, the condition that the defendant "refrain from the use of alcohol or 
drugs, undergo treatment for drug addiction or alcoholism, and/or submit to 
periodic testing." NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard IV-C-8 
(emphasis added). 
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conditions of release. For decades, money had been the means 
by which judges sought (sometimes unsuccessfully) to detain 
defendants believed not to merit release. Even when judges 
believed that a low bond would lead to release, this did not 
always happen. Thus the use of monetary bonds often 
frustrated the intentions of the court, and at the very least did 
not promote the kind of careful assessment of the potential 
"dangerousness" of a defendant that both the community and 
the defendant were entitled to expect. Therefore, holding true 
to the early ideals of the bail reform movement, the pretrial 
association went on record in 1978 calling for the complete end 
to all forms of money bond. 38 
Acknowledging that some defendants would simply not be 
released, the NAPSA recognized that an alternative mechanism 
for pretrial detention would have to exist in any credible 
"model" of pretrial justice. Standards describing a pretrial 
detention procedure were developed.39 The model procedure 
places limits on the kinds of defendants eligible for pretrial 
detention, stressing that one of the requisite judicial findings is 
that there are no conditions that will "reasonably minimize the 
substantial risk of flight,"40 or "the substantial risk of danger 
to the community."41 
A model system of pretrial decision-making envisions a 
continuation of the long-recognized presumption in favor of 
release, an end to monetary conditions of release, and a more 
honest and accountable process for determining which 
arrestees are to be locked up pending trial. If such a system 
were ever codified, it would, in the opinion of some bail reform 
advocates, at last eliminate the abuses inherent in our money 
bond system. It would bring pretrial release or detention 
practices into the light of day where the basis of a prosecutor's 
conclusion that a defendant is "dangerous" or flight prone 
would be subject to scrutiny in a due process hearing. 
Conditions of release take on major importance in this scheme, 
38 NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard V, states: "The use 
of financial conditions of release should be eliminated." The ABA standards did not 
go as far, but did state: "[c]ompensated sureties should be abolished." ABA 
STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard 10-5.5, and that "Monetary conditions should 
be set only when it is found that no other conditions on release will reasonably 
assure the defendant's appearance in court." !d., Standard 10-5.4. 
39 NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard VII. 
40 NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard VII(A)(1). 
41 NAPSA RELEASE STANDARDS, supra note 35, Standard VII(A)(2). 
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as even dangerous defendants are entitled to pretrial release if 
that release can be safely supervised. As will be discussed in 
Section V, an understanding of this conceptual framework is 
crucial to the position of this article that pretrial drug testing 
is an essential step in bail reform. 
To a large degree, the bail reform movement, begun with 
such excitement and anticipation in the mid 1960s, is a 
revolution that has stalled in mid-stream. Progress has been 
made here and there, but by and large, pretrial practices in 
many jurisdictions operate as they have for decades. Only one 
state-Kentucky-has outlawed bail bonding for profit.42 
Some states have adopted cash deposit bail systems, effectively 
eliminating bail bondsmen, yet retaining money bonds and all 
of the inequities associated with financial conditions of 
release.43 Most states and the federal system have adopted 
pretrial detention laws, but have not eliminated financial 
conditions of release. 44 Thus, rather than changing the 
mechanism for making release/detention decisions, legislatures 
have simply added a new procedure without eliminating the old 
one. There has been little pressure to change the structure of 
pretrial release decision making. Many of the inequities 
chronicled by Arthur Beeley more than half a century ago, 
remain with us today. 45 
42 Comprehensive bail reform was accomplished in Kentucky in February, 
1976, through the enactment of KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.510-550 (Baldwin 1991), 
which abolished the practice of bail bonding for profit, and required all trial courts 
to provide pretrial release and investigation services in lieu of commercial bail 
bondsmen. The establishment of the Pretrial Services Agency and guidelines to 
facilitate the pretrial release process were accomplished by the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky through revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to bail. KY. 
R.C.P. 4.00-4.58. 
43 D. ALAN HENRY, PRETRIAL SERVICES RESOURCE CENTER, TEN PERCENT 
DEPOSIT BAIL (1990). 
44 The futility of this approach has been documented in a study: GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-88-6, CRIMINAL BAIL: How BAIL REFORM IS 
WORKING IN SELECTED DISTRICT COURTS (1987) [hereinafter CRIMINAL BAIL]. In 
examining the effect of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, the study found that 
after the law went into effect, detention rates went up, failure-to-appear rates 
remained very low under the old and the new law (around 2%), and re-arrest rates 
also remained very low (1.8% under the old law and 0.8% under the new law). 
Finally, in direct opposition to the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (1988) 
("the judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in ... 
detention ... "), fully half of the detained defendants were detained because they 
could not afford the bail. In two districts the percentage was even higher. 
45 BEELEY, supra note 16. 
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IV. DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The premise of this article is that drug testing is an 
essential step in completing the bail reform revolution. This 
argument rests on four pillars: (1) the close association between 
drug abuse and criminal behavior; (2) the extent of drug 
dependency among criminal justice or "offender" populations; 
(3) the effectiveness of drug testing in identifying drug users 
and assessing risk; and finally, (4) the usefulness of drug 
testing as a monitoring technique for pretrial defendants. 
A. The Drug I Crime Association 
The close association between heavy drug use and criminal 
behavior is now beyond question. A large body of literature 
exists on heroin addiction and its connection to criminal behav-
ior, and more recent studies are now appearing on the associa-
tion between criminal behavior and other drugs, such as 
"crack" cocaine. 46 Some of the most thorough studies of hero-
in addicts have demonstrated that addiction tends to be a long 
term, chronic affliction, and that most addicts persist in high 
levels of criminal behavior for many years, despite periods of 
incarceration or treatment. Many studies have focused on the 
high correlation between heroin addiction and property 
crime,47 and have established that addiction to heroin is fol-
lowed by increases in these crimes. In studies of "career crimi-
nals" by the Rand Corporation, most of the inmates classified 
as "violent predators" among inmates in three states had histo-
ries of heroin use in combination with other drugs and alcohol. 
Among all factors analyzed, in fact, a history of drug abuse was 
one of the best indicators or predictors of high-rate criminal 
behavior.48 Other studies have confirmed that arrestees using 
46 James A. lnciardi & Anne E. Pottieger, Kids, Crack, and Crime, 21 JoUR· 
NAL OF DRUG IssUES 257 (1991). "In conclusion," write the authors, "the crack· 
crime dynamic, at least for adolescent crack dealers, represents an intensified 
version of the classic drug-crime relationship originally described for (adult) heroin 
users. Both patterns rest on addiction, but for crack, addiction onset appears to 
be more rapid while maximum physiological--and thus financial requirements--seem 
more unlimited." ld. at 269. 
47 For a description of a longitudinal study of heroin addicts in Baltimore, 
Maryland, see John C. Ball et al., The Criminality of Heroin Addicts--When Ad-
dicted and When Off Opiates, in THE DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION 39-66 (James A. 
Inciardi ed., 1981). 
48 JAN M. CHAIKEN & MARCIA R. CHAIKEN, VARIETIES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 
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drugs heavily are more likely to be committing crimes at very 
high (over 100 annually) rates.49 
Given the correlation between high rates of drug abuse and 
high rates of criminality, the question often arises as to the 
types of crimes associated with drug use. Are most drug users 
involved in the kinds of income-generating or drug distribution 
crimes needed to "support a habit?" Or are high rate drug abus-
ers also involved with other kinds of violent crime as well? 
While more research needs to be done on this issue, some data 
suggests that ''heroin-using offenders are just as likely as their 
non-drug using or non-heroin using counterparts to commit vio-
lent crimes (such as homicide, sexual assault, and arson), and 
even more likely to commit robbery and weapons offenses."50 
This theme-that drug use and criminal behavior are 
closely related among offender populations-is supported by 
many other studies. Looking at arrestees, for example, a study 
of self-reported drug use in the District of Columbia from 1979-
1981 established that drug users released before trial were 
twice as likely to be rearrested than were non-users. 51 And in 
a more comprehensive evaluation of a program of pretrial drug 
testing in the District of Columbia using data from 1984, 
arrestees testing positive for one drug were more likely to be 
rearrested before trial, and arrestees testing positive for two or 
more drugs even more likely to be rearrested.52 Similar find-
ings have been reported from a sample of 2606 arrestees pro-
cessed through the Manhattan Criminal Courts in New York City.53 
64 (1982). 
49 BRUCE D. JOHNSON & ERIC D. WISH, NARCOTIC AND DRUG RESEARCH, INC., 
CRIME RATES AMONG DRUG-ABUSING OFFENDERS, FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (1986). 
50 BERNARD A. GROPPER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBING THE LINKS BETWEEN 
DRUGS AND CRIME (National Inst. of Justice, Research in Brief, February 1985). 
51 MARY A. TOBORG & MICHAEL P. KIRBY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 94073, 
DRUG USE AND PRETRIAL CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (National Inst. of 
Justice, Research in Brief, October 1984). 
52 See Anthony M.J. Yezer et a!., The Efficacy of Using Urine-Testing Results 
in Risk Classification, in ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL URINE TESTING IN THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA (Toborg Associates, Inc. eds., National Institute of Justice Monograph 
No. 6, 1987). For a general overview of this program, see John A. Carver, Drugs 
and Crime: Controlling Use and Reducing Risk Through Testing, NATIONAL INST. 
OF JuST. REP., SNI 199, September/October 1986, at 2. 
53 Douglas A. Smith et a!., Drug Use and Pretrial Misconduct in New York 
City, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 101 (1989). The study concluded that "(T]he 
percentage [of defendants] who fail, by either FTA or rearrest, increases with the 
number of positive test results." Id. at 109. "The data indicate that the number of 
drugs a person tests positive for is related to the probability of FTA and rearrest, 
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Just as drug addiction has been shown to be associated 
with very high rates of criminal activity, there is also consider-
able evidence for a corollary hypothesis-that reductions in 
drug use correspond with reductions in criminal behavior.54 
This observation is valid even when the reductions in drug use 
are non-voluntary, such as when drug-dependent offenders are 
"coerced" into treatment as a condition of probation or pa-
role.55 Finally, there is also considerable evidence for the prop-
osition that the longer an addict remains in treatment, the bet-
ter the outcome in terms of "drug free" days. 56 
These addiction studies have powerful implications for the 
criminal justice system. The most drug-dependent individuals 
are those most likely to commit crimes and at some point come 
under the jurisdiction of the court. The criminal justice system 
has significant power over criminal defendants, probationers, 
and parolees. This power is exercised by imposing conditions of 
pretrial release or conditions of probation backed up by the 
threat of sanctions (including incarceration) for violations of 
these conditions or contempt of court orders. To summarize, the 
most dysfunctional drug abusers tend to be the most crime-
prone individuals who are already under the jurisdiction of the 
court. Thus, the court has existing authority to require treat-
even after controlling for other factors typically available to the judge at the time 
of the pretrial release decision." !d. at 123. 
54 William H. McGlothlin et al., A Follow-up of Admissions to the California 
Civil Addict Program, 4 AM. J. OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE 179 (1977). 
55 Carl G. Leukefeld & Frank M. Tims, Compulsory Treatment: A Review of 
Findings, in COMPULSORY DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 247 
(National Institute on Drug Abuse Research Monograph No. 86, 1988). Writing in 
the same monograph, M. Douglas Anglin notes: 
The general conclusion . . . is that civil commitment and other drug 
treatment initiatives ... are effective ways to reduce narcotics addiction 
and to minimize the adverse social effects associated with it. How an 
individual is exposed to treatment seems to be irrelevant. What is im-
portant is that the narcotics addict must be brought into an environment 
where intervention can occur over time. Civil commitment and other 
legally coercive measures are useful and proven strategies to get people 
into a treatment program when they will not enter voluntarily. The use 
of such measures ... could produce significant individual and social ben-
efits. 
M. Douglas Anglin, The Efficacy of Civil Commitment in Treating Narcotic Addic-
tion, in COMPULSORY DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 8, 31 (Na-
tional Institute of Drug Abuse Research Monograph No. 86, 1988). 
56 NATIONAL ASS'N OF STATE ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE DIRECTORS, THE 
TRAGIC COST OF UNDER-VALUING TREATMENT IN THE "DRUG WAR". A REVIEW OF 15 
YEARS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS ON ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT 
OUTCOMES (1990). 
388 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 5 
ment. Involuntary or coerced treatment is effective because it 
keeps drug-dependent individuals in treatment longer. Court 
intervention can reduce drug use which can lead to correspond-
ing reductions in crime. 
B. Extent of Drug Dependency Among Criminal Justice Popu-
lations 
Criminal Justice practitioners have long recognized that 
society's drug-dependent members are well represented among 
arrestee and offender populations. This recognition has been 
supported by statistics on drug arrests, government sponsored 
surveys of prison inmates,57 and research projects.58 To a cer-
tain extent, all of these efforts to quantify the extent of drug 
dependency among "offender" populations were "educated 
guesses," hampered by methodological uncertainties. Many of 
these attempts to estimate drug use prevalence rates relied on 
interviews of inmates. Even in research interview settings with 
guarantees of confidentiality, there is a certain degree of under-
reporting about crimes and drug use. Rates of "sampling bias" 
are further compounded by a variety of factors in criminal case 
processing. 
It has only been within the last four years that policy mak-
ers have been able to gain a much clearer picture of the extent 
of drug abuse currently flooding the system. The DUF, funded 
by the National Institute of Justice, is a quarterly sampling of 
arrestees in twenty-three cities. The survey consists of both a 
confidential interview consisting of a series of questions on 
current and past drug use, age of first use, treatment history, 
and other data. Unlike other drug abuse prevalence indica-
tors,59 subjects of this survey are requested to provide a urine 
67 See, e.g., Prisoners and Drugs, 1983 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLE-
TIN NCJ-87575 (reporting that "almost a third of all State prisoners in 1979 were 
under the influence of an illegal drug when they committed the crimes for which 
they were incarcerated."); see also Allen J. Beck, Profile of Jail Inmates, 1989, 1991 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT NCJ-129097 (reporting that "in-
mates ... in jail for drug violations increased from 9.3% of the population in 1983 
to 23% in 1989," and that "during the month before their offense, more than 4 of 
every 10 convicted inmates in 1989 had used a drug-more than 1 of every 4 were 
users of a major drug."). 
58 For an excellent compilation of scientific studies in this area, see CRIMINAL 
CAREERS AND CAREER CRIMINALS (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1986). 
69 Other indicators include the High School Senior Survey, the National 
Household Survey, and the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). For an over-
view and description of these and other indicators, see OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG 
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sample, which is then tested for the presence of ten drugs of 
abuse, with the results correlated with the data from the inter-
view instrument. To the initial surprise of many, the arrestee 
population is thoroughly saturated with drugs.60 While the 
percent positive for drugs varies from city to city, it is consis-
tently over 50% in all sites surveyed. According to the 1989 
Drug Use Forecasting Annual Report,61 the percentage of 
males testing positive for any drug ranged from a low of 53% in 
San Antonio, to a high of 82% in San Diego. In eight of the 
seventeen cities surveyed, in 1989, 70% or more of the female 
arrestees tested positive for a drug. A subsequent study using 
DUF data estimated that "cocaine use in arrestees in the prior 
2-3 days (based on the urinalysis) was 17 to 25 times greater 
than the use in the past month found in the general 
population .... These differences would be even greater if the 
window of detection for the urine tests extended to the prior 30 
days."62 
Drug use may be declining among the general population, 
but heavy or chronic use is still substantial.63 These individu-
als are concentrated in the criminal justice system, as the DUF 
results amply demonstrate.64 Moreover, the heavily-dependent 
CONTROL POLICY, WHITE PAPER SIN 040-000-00547-1, LEADING DRUG INDICATORS 
(1990). 
60 See infra Appendix, Tables I-VI for statistics on booked arrestees testing 
positive for specific drugs. 
61 Drugs and Crime, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 1989 DRUG USE 
FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1990). 
62 Eric D. Wish, U.S. Drug Policy in the 1990s: Insights from New Data from 
Arrestees, 25 INTERNATIONAL J. OF THE ADDICTIONS 377, 387 (1990) (emphasis in 
original). 
63 A recent report prepared for use by the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
United States Senate concluded that "there are 2.4 million hard-core cocaine 
addicts--about 1 out of every 100 Americans." STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., DRUG USE IN AMERICA: Is THE EPIDEMIC REAL-
LY OVER? 23 (Comm. Print 1990). The report further found that "the national 
total of hard-core heroin addicts is 940,000, nearly twice the Administration's 
official estimate of 500,000. The Administration relies only on the Household 
Survey of Drug Abuse. Our data from many sources--including the Justice Depart-
ment and state drug treatment centers--indicate a much higher total: 940,000. Id. 
at 30. See also Michael lsikoff, Hospital Data Indicate Rise in Hard-Core Drug 
Abuse, WASH. POST, May 13, 1992, at A-1 ("The federal government's Drug Abuse 
Warning Network (DAWN), considered a key indicator for measuring trends in 
hard-core drug abuse, reported yesterday there were 28,700 cocaine-related visits to 
hospital emergency rooms from July through September 1991, a 13 percent in-
crease over the previous three months and nearly 46 percent higher than the 
comparable period in 1990."). 
64 See Drugs and Crime, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 1989 DRUG USE 
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drug users tend to be the most dysfunctional, most troublesome 
individuals, causing a disproportionate share of criminal 
acts. 65 Finally, the concentration of drug addicts in the crimi-
nal justice system is nothing new, but has been prevalent for 
many years. 66 
The close association between drug use and criminal be-
havior, coupled with the knowledge that reductions in drug use 
lead to corresponding reductions in criminal behavior, suggest 
two important reasons for conducting pretrial drug testing. 
First, the knowledge that there is an association (not necessari-
ly a causal relationship) between drug use and crime means 
that knowledge about drug use is potentially useful for judges 
in assessing pretrial release eligibility. Second, to the extent 
that court "coercion" can be effective in reducing drug use and 
bringing about a corresponding reduction in criminality, drug 
testing (possibly coupled with treatment) offers the promise of 
improved monitoring pending final case disposition. Just how 
effective is a positive drug test result in assessing a defendant's 
likelihood of pretrial misconduct? The following section exam-
ines this question. 
C. Drug Testing as a Means of Assessing Risk 
One of the most basic functions of a pretrial services agen-
cy is to assist judicial officers by gathering information relevant 
to the first decision that must be made-whether, and under 
what conditions, to release a defendant pending trial. Since the 
earliest experimental pretrial programs were initiated in the 
1960s, program personnel have questioned defendants about a 
variety of factors believed to be useful in assessing the 
defendant's potential for returning to court, and, more recently, 
avoiding rearrests. These factors have traditionally included 
FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1990); Drugs and Crime, in NATIONAL INSfiTUTE 
OF JUSf!CE, 1989 DRUG USE FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1991); Eric D. Wish, 
U.S. Drug Policy in the 1990s: Insights from New Data from Arrestees, 25 INTERNA-
TIONAL J. OF THE ADDICTIONS 377 (1990). Dr. Wish notes: "The data that we have 
presented indicate that some of the most serious drug use can be found in persons 
being detained and monitored by the criminal justice system. As many as one half 
of the frequent cocaine users in the United States are contained in the arrestee 
population." ld. at 385. 
•• GROPPER, supra note 50. 
66 Herman Joseph, The Criminal Justice System and Opiate Addiction: A 
Historical Perspective, in COMPULSORY TREATMENT OF DRUG ABUSE: RESEARCH AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE 106 (National Institute of Drug Abuse Research Monograph No. 
86, 1988). 
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length of time in the community and at a given address, em-
ployment status, family ties, prior criminal history, and drug 
use. Deficiencies in any of these areas typically result in a low-
er "score" in the program's risk assessment instrument. Verifi-
cation or corroboration of information supplied by the defen-
dant is important, with verified information resulting in a more 
favorable recommendation. 
In the area of drugs, virtually all programs ask the defen-
dant about possible drug use and drug treatment status. Un-
like residence information, drug use information (or more spe-
cifically, denials about drug involvement) have been difficult to 
verify. Drug testing offers the possibility of providing the Court 
with scientifically verified and objective information about the 
existence of drugs in the defendant's system shortly after ar-
rest. 
To obtain this information, two teams of staff of the D.C. 
Pretrial Services Agency enter the courthouse cellblock every 
morning. One team conducts the traditional pretrial interview, 
asking defendants where they live, work, whether they have 
been arrested before, whether they use drugs, and so forth. 
Another team collects urine samples from each arrestee. Prior 
to collecting the sample, the staff member identifies himself, 
requests a urine sample, explains the purpose for the request 
and the limitations on the use of the results.67 Only about two 
percent of the defendants approached refuse to give a sam-
ple.68 Samples are transported immediately to the Agency's 
67 Agency procedures require the staff member to give the following warning 
before collecting a urine sample: 
My name is and I work for the Pretrial Services 
Agency. I am here to collect a urine sample from you. You do not have 
to give a sample, but if you do, the sample will be tested for drugs and 
the results given to the judge or hearing commissioner for use at your 
bail hearing. The test results will be used only to determine conditions of 
release in your case. They cannot be used to determine whether you are 
guilty or innocent of today's charges. If you choose not to provide a sam-
ple, the Court may order you to provide one if and when you are re-
leased. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY, TRAINING AND PROCEDURE 
MANUAL 159 (1991). 
68 Monthly Collection Rate Statistics Assembled by Michael Gunn, Supervisor, 
Adult Drug Detection Unit (Jan. - Dec. 1991) (on file with author). The low refusal 
rate is surprising to some, but perhaps can be explained by the common realiza-
tion among defendants (many of whom have been through the system before) that 
even a positive result will not be the determining factor in the judge's release 
decision. Indeed, refusing to provide a sample will generally result in a court-or-
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on-site lab, where they are analyzed for the presence of five 
drugs.69 The drug results are then incorporated into the 
Agency's recommendation and made available to the judicial 
officer in arraignment court. 
One of the empirical questions of great interest to program 
administrators was the usefulness of a drug test at this stage 
for risk assessment purposes. The National Institute of Justice 
sponsored an independent evaluation of the pretrial drug test-
ing program of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agen-
cy. This evaluation looked at several research questions, includ-
ing the question of the efficacy of using drug test results in risk 
classification of arrestees. This study, conducted by the re-
search firm of Toborg Associates, found that "urine test results 
make a consistent, significant, incremental contribution to risk 
classification for arrestees in the District of Columbia."70 In 
other words, looking at rearrests and failures-to-appear as the 
outcome measures, urine tests improved pretrial risk classifica-
tion over and above the factors already in use for this purpose, 
such as community ties and prior criminal record. A separate 
evaluation of data from the D.C. program concluded that 
the most striking result in these analyses is the size of the 
risk multiplier associated with a positive drug test result. For 
subjects testing positive for a single drug other than PCP, the 
rearrest risk in the early weeks after release is three to four 
times as great as their drug-negative counterparts; and if two 
drugs are involved, it is nearly five times as great. 71 
D. Drug Testing as a Monitoring Technique 
If the first priority of a pretrial services agency is to advise 
the court on a defendant's release eligibility, the second priority 
must be to supervise the release conditions once they are im-
posed by the judge. When the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency 
dered condition to provide one after release for purposes of evaluation, and if 
positive, to submit to regular testing. Many defendants may conclude that there is 
really nothing to be gained by refusing to provide a sample when first approached. 
69 The five drugs are: cocaine, opiates, methadone, amphetamines, and PCP. 
70 MARY A. TOBORG ET AL., U.S. DEp'T OF JUSTICE, ASSESSMENT OF PRETRIAL 
URINE TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 10 (National lnst. of Justice, Issues 
and Practices, December 1989) (emphasis omitted). 
71 Yezer et al., supra note 52, at 10 (citing Christy Visher & Richard Linster, 
A Survival Model of Pretrial Failure, Draft Discussion Paper Presented at the 1988 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology 23 (Nov. 9-12, 1988)). 
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began its drug testing program in 1984, a key component of the 
program was the introduction of drug testing as a condition of 
release. Recognizing that there was little value in identifying 
drug users unless the agency could recommend a release option 
to address the problem, the Agency devised a monitoring pro-
gram with clear goals, and set about to evaluate it. 72 
Among the research questions investigated by the indepen-
dent evaluator, Toborg Associates, was the usefulness of period-
ic urine testing as a post-release monitoring technique. To 
examine this question, drug-positive releasees were randomly 
assigned to one of three groups. One group was placed in pe-
riodic urine testing only; a second group was referred for treat-
ment to the citywide drug abuse treatment agency; and a third 
group served as a "control" group released with neither urine 
testing nor referral to treatment. The outcome measures were: 
failure to appear; rearrest on new charges; or a combination of 
both, termed "pretrial misconduct." 
Overall, the urine testing group performed slightly better 
than either the "treatment" group or the "control" group. More 
important, however, was the way in which the "drug testing" 
group quickly separated itself into two sub-groups with large 
differences in expected pretrial arrest rates, failure-to-appear 
rates, and overall pretrial misconduct rates. The first sub-
group, termed "successful participants" by the evaluators, ap-
peared as required for drug testing. The second sub group, 
dubbed "non-participants," quickly dropped out of the program. 
The rearrest rate of the "successful participants" was half that 
of the "non-participants." These differences appeared within 
four weeks of release. This research suggests that while drug-
positive defendants as a group pose greater-than-average re-
lease risks, they can nevertheless be safely released, as long as 
the release is conditioned on periodic reporting for urinalysis. 
Participation in the drug testing program operates as a "signal" 
that the defendant possesses behavioral characteristics associ-
ated with a lower risk of pretrial misconduct. Those who "sig-
72 The goals were spelled out in various written descriptions of the program: 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the new testing program was the 
development of regular drug testing as a condition of release. The goal of 
this aspect of the program was simple-to reduce the use of drugs, there-
by reducing (it was hoped) the increased risks of pretrial misconduct 
posed by the release of drug users. 
Carver, supra note 52, at 4 (emphasis in original). 
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nal" their unwillingness or inability to comply with court orders 
can be brought back to court for some sort of action or further 
intervention. 
A separate analysis of the same data validated the Toborg 
findings, adding further refinement. 73 This secondary analysis 
confirmed that drug-involved defendants who fail to show up 
for their first drug testing appointment are more likely to be 
rearrested than those who do show up as required. However, 
looking only at those who do not appear, among those who had 
at least three of five additional characteristics. 74 Sixty-one per-
cent were rearrested as opposed to just twenty-one percent of 
the sub-group with less than three of the identified characteris-
tics. The author observes: 
In essence, this is a two-stage classification, which is 
recognized in some research on criminal behavior as a more 
accurate method for assessing risk than simply trying to iden-
tify high-risk offenders among a large heterogeneous group. 
The first stage is classifying the subset of defendants who fail 
to show up for the first postrelease urine test as much more 
likely to be rearrested than those who test negative or posi-
tive. Then, among this high-risk group, use of the five addi-
tional factors-the second stage-increases the accuracy of 
identifying those defendants at risk for rearrest.75 
The policy implications of this research are quite powerful. 
They suggest that even those defendants in the category of 
highest statistical risk (i.e. chronic drug users with prior crimi-
nal records) can be effectively managed or supervised during 
the pretrial period. This is not to suggest that the supervision, 
in and of itself, is sufficient in every case, or even in most cas-
es. It does suggest that many defendants can be safely released 
before trial, if such release is conditioned on periodic drug 
testing. With the drug testing capability, the research suggests 
that defendants will quickly sort themselves into two sub-
groups: those who comply, and those who don't. Those who do 
not or cannot comply (especially when non-compliance occurs in 
73 Christy Visher, Using Drug Testing to Identify High-Risk Defendants on Re-
lease: A Study in the District of Columbia, 18 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 321, 325 (1990). 
74 The "five additional characteristics were: (1) defendant initially arrested for 
a felony (as opposed to a misdemeanor); (2) positive test result at arrest for heroin 
and cocaine; (3) at least one prior adult conviction; (4) the defendant was male; 
and (5) defendant was unemployed at the time of the arrest." !d. at 328. 
75 Visher, supra note 73, at 229 (footnotes omitted). 
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conjunction with several easily-identifiable risk factors) are 
statistically much more likely to be rearrested. Since these 
defendants have violated a court order, the court can then 
impose more restrictive conditions of release or revoke re-
lease. 76 In short, the monitoring capability permits the court 
to release a larger number of cases, and then concentrate its 
resources on those who fail to abide by the terms of that re-
lease. 
V. DRUG ABUSE AND A MODEL SYSTEM OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
True bail reform will not be accomplished until all forms of 
money bail are abolished. As long as money bail persists, it 
provides a quick and expedient way to avoid tough decisions. 
The money bail system is quick and easy. It does not require 
any kind of a hearing other than that required to set the 
amount. It puts off until another day the consequences of the 
decision. If, at some later date, the defendant's "friends" some-
how come up with the cash to bail him out, then that "release 
decision" is not one taken by any actors in the system. The 
defendant's release does not occur before the eyes of reporters 
in the audience. The fact that the defendant posted the bond 
may not even be known to the judge or the prosecutor, except 
as possibly a computer entry should anyone bother to look. 
Attempts to impose accountability and fairness (by requiring 
detention hearings) without eliminating financial conditions of 
release have failed. 77 
76 Courts have broad authority to enforce their orders through a variety of 
mechanisms. Additional release conditions can be imposed in response to a viola-
tion. These additional conditions might take the form of increased frequency of 
testing, referral to treatment, enrollment in a residential treatment program, or 
possibly placement in a halfway house. Courts can also invoke their inherent 
powers to enforce their orders, convening a hearing at which the defendant is 
required to "show cause" why he or she should not be held in contempt of court 
for violating the order. See Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M., 
& O.R., 266 U.S. 42 (1924) ("[T]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all 
courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is 
essential to the administration of justice."). In the District of Columbia, a separate 
provision of the law, D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1329 (1991), spells out "penalties for 
violation of conditions of release," and states that "A person who has been condi-
tionally released . . . and who has violated a condition of relEase shall be subject 
to revocation of release, an order of detention, and prosecution for contempt of 
court." 
77 Prior to passing the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, which authorized 
pretrial detention based on dangerousness in the federal system, Congress consid-
ered eliminating financial conditions of release. In one of the Senate Reports 
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As state and local governments face ever-tightening bud-
gets, they can no longer afford to operate inefficiently in any 
sphere. Inefficiencies in the criminal justice system are espe-
cially costly. These costs are really a two-edged sword. On the 
one side, are the escalating costs in the budgets of corrections 
departments. To the extent that inefficiencies result in higher 
detention costs, the fiscal impact is staggering.78 On the other 
side is the cost to public safety and welfare. To the extent that 
system inefficiencies result in the release of chronic drug abus-
ers without the system knowing they are chronic users, and 
without imposing proper controls through drug testing and 
treatment, we now know that some of these individuals will 
persist in committing crimes at very high rates. 
Because of the fact that both of these "costs" to the commu-
nity are becoming intolerable, more and more jurisdictions are 
looking for ways to bring efficiency and accountability to pretri-
al release decision making. Herein lies the promise of pretrial 
services and the hope for reform. 
The model system envisioned by the NAPSA offers a 
considering one of the many bills that was eventually enacted, the Judiciary 
Committee wrote: 
It is the intent of the Committee that the pretrial detention provisions of 
section 3502 replace any existing practice of detaining dangerous defen-
dants through the imposition of excessively high money bond. Because of 
concern that the opportunity to use financial conditions of release to 
achieve pretrial detention would provide a means of circumventing the 
procedural safeguards and standard of proof requirement of a pretrial 
detention provision, the Committee was urged to do away with money 
bond entirely. Indeed, section 3502 of this bill as introduced did not pro-
vide for imposition of financial conditions of release. While the retention 
of money bond does create the potential for such abuse, the Committee 
concluded, after consideration of arguments for continuing to provide dis-
cretion to impose financial conditions of release, that the abolition of 
money bond at this time would promote unnecessary controversy. Instead, 
the bill assures the goal of precluding detention through use· of high mon-
ey bond by stating explicitly that "[t]he judge may not impose a financial 
condition that results in the detention of the person." 
S. Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1155 (1981) (citations omitted). The United 
States General Accounting Office Report, CRIMINAL BAIL, supra note 44, at 25, 
notes that the intention of Congress has been thwarted, as many defendants con-
tinue to be detained in lieu of bond, without ever having the benefit of a detention 
hearing in which to challenge the presumption of dangerousness or flight, or to 
insist that release options be considered before ordering detention. 
78 The United States Department of Justice notes that "[prison] construction 
costs typically range between $50,000 and $75,000 per bed. Additional money is 
needed each year--about $10,000 to $15,000 per prisoner--to maintain, guard, and 
manage prisoners." ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON CROWDING 
2 (National Inst. of Justice, CRIME FILE Study Guide). 
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framework for greatly improved pretrial decision making. Ac-
cording to this scheme, every release decision would be made 
on its own merits-not on the "roll of the dice" of factors be-
yond the Court's control. Defendants coming before the court 
would be entitled to a presumption in favor of release. Depend-
ing on the results of the background investigation by the pretri-
al services agency, the release decision process would follow an 
ordered progression from least to most restrictive conditions of 
release, tailored to that individual. In carefully limited situa-
tions, the prosecutor could invoke a detention hearing, but one 
of the requisite findings before detention could be ordered 
would be a judicial determination that there would be no condi-
tions of release that could reasonably assure community safety. 
Such a process brings us full circle back to drug testing. A 
model system can only work if the judge has complete, rele-
vant, and accurate information to assess the need for condi-
tions. Drug testing is a vital element in scientifically verifying, 
or corroborating, one of the most important factors relating to 
the potential risk posed by the defendant's release. Just as it 
would be ludicrous to take the defendant's word that he has 
never previously been arrested without checking his criminal 
record, so too does it appear inconsistent with the role of pretri-
al services as neutral fact-finder to take the defendant's word 
on drug use, without a corroborating drug test. 
Assuming the judge has a full and complete background 
report, the question of release conditions must then be consid-
ered. A system in which criminal justice actors may no longer 
take refuge behind a money bond will require a full range of 
release alternatives for the full range of defendants flooding the 
system. Drugs are a major factor in the criminal justice system. 
Long after we have "won the drug war" in our workplaces and 
in our school systems, we will still be seeing chronic, hard-core 
addicts in our criminal justice system. Given what we now 
know about the drug/crime association, it is difficult to imagine 
a community tolerating the pretrial release of drug-abusing 
defendants without proper monitoring. If the system is to real-
ize the full potential of bail reform-a system where most de-
fendants are released, and only a few detained after full due-
process hearing-it must have the means to deal with our most 
intractable and most persistent problem-drug abuse. Drug 
testing provides the means. It is not a panacea, but a necessary 
tool for managing risk among large numbers of people who are 
already the responsibility of the Court by virtue of their arrest. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The challenges facing the criminal justice system have 
never been grater. Courts must process large numbers of crim-
inal arrestees, many of whom are charged with increasingly 
serious offenses. Many, if not most of these arrestees are drug 
users, posing additional burdens on "the system." The devas-
tating impact of drugs on certain communities has fueled in-
tense political pressure which has in turn led to the enactment 
of new laws restricting bail or expanding the application of 
minimum mandatory sentences. Not surprisingly, all of these 
factors have contributed to unprecedented jail and prison 
crowding. As correctional facilities become ever more crowded, 
federal lawsuits are often brought challenging as unconstitu-
tional the conditions of confinement. These lawsuits often 
result in court-ordered "caps" at certain institutions. Occasion-
ally, entire prison systems are placed under court supervi-
sion.79 
State and local governments are increasingly unable to pay 
for the seemingly endless demands of the justice and correc-
tional systems, especially when schools, police and social wel-
fare agencies are also feeling the budget "pinch." The gap 
between essential public services and the revenues needed to 
support them appears to be widening. In such an environment, 
public officials are being forced to re-think how their services 
are delivered. There is no longer any leeway to operate ineffi-
ciently. This is especially true in criminal justice. 
The dilemma facing state and local governments is exacer-
bated by the drug problem. As had been detailed above, we 
now know a great deal about drugs, and the association be-
tween drug use and crime. We know, for example, that among 
offender populations, multiple drug use is often associated with 
high rates of criminal activity. We also know that drug addic-
79 A 1988 monograph prepared by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation 
found that: 
There are now 15 states whose entire prison systems have operated under 
court orders because of consent decrees or by virtue of having been de-
clared unconstitutional. In nine, special masters monitor corrections 
officials' remedial programs. Masters are also at work in seven states 
where individual institutions have been declared substandard. In addi-
tions, masters serve in at least 65 jail systems. 
BRUCE PORTER, EDNA MCCONNELL CLARK FOUNDATION, SPECIAL MASTERS IN COR-
RECTIONS 4 (1988). 
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tion tends to be a long term, recurring phenomenon, where 
periods of relative abstinence from drugs are associated with 
lowered rates of criminal activity, and vice versa. Finally, we 
know that court-mandated treatment is more effective in reduc-
ing drug dependence (and lowering rates of criminality) than is 
voluntary treatment, and that when court-ordered treatment is 
enforced with regular drug testing, the results are even more 
favorable. 
On the surface, this suggests we either "incapacitate" drug 
users by locking them up, or send them to quality treatment 
programs and insist they stay there. On closer examination, 
however, it becomes evident that no matter how attractive 
either option may be, the system simply does not have the 
capacity to incarcerate or treat more than a small percentage of 
the problem. Given the extent of drug use among arrestees, it 
is unrealistic to expect to find either a jail cell or a treatment 
slot for the high volume of new cases flooding the system every 
day. 
What is needed is to rethink our way of doing things. 
Traditionally, we have used an "all or nothing" approach. At 
the various release points throughout the system, the alterna-
tives are to release or detain. If released, the alternatives tend 
to be "do nothing" or revoke release. When confronted with the 
magnitude of the drug abuse problem, we can no longer afford 
to use our scarce resources in such an inefficient manner. We 
need to begin thinking of drug abuse among offender popula-
tions less as a "problem" in need of a "solution" and more as an 
almost permanent "condition" which, it if can't be solved by the 
court system, can at least be "managed" in a far more cost-
effective way for society. 
The experience of the D.C. Pretrial Services Agency in the 
monitoring of pretrial releasees through drug testing, offers 
encouragement for this approach. Monitoring alone, when set 
up to include quick responses to violations, has proven at least 
as effective as treatment for many when one looks at overall 
rates of pretrial misconduct. This is not to suggest that drug 
monitoring be viewed as a substitute for drug treatment. Rath-
er, it recognizes that both jail space and quality treatment are 
expensive, scarce commodities. We should begin to look for 
ways to allocate them more effectively. Ongoing drug abuse 
monitoring is perhaps the best means of selecting those who 
really need treatment or jail. It also is a workable means of 
supervising vast numbers of releasees. 
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The foundation of this strategy would be to establish strict 
accountability with respect to drug use among all "drug offend-
ers" under the supervision of the court system. A variety of 
responses (including treatment and jail) would be employed in 
a dynamic process to establish this accountability. Such a 
strategy would have to include the following elements: 
Comprehensive drug testing and monitoring, beginning 
at the point of arrest, and continuing through probation 
or parole. 
Greater use of existing drug testing and computer tech-
nology, whereby subjects await the outcome of each urine 
test, and are provided with immediate feedback as the 
results. 
A system whereby the individual would not only be con-
fronted immediately with the drug test results, but 
would face immediate consequences. 
A contingency management approach, where specific 
responses would 'be used to impose sanctions for viola-
tions, or to reward compliance. The sanctioning philoso-
phy would be based on graduated and escalating re-
sponses to drug use, rather that simply revoking release. 
In other words, the approach would be to "tighten the 
screws" by, say, intensifying the frequency of testing, 
referring the individual to treatment, and even using 
short (but increasing long) jail stays to deal with repeat-
ed violations, followed by re-release. In this way, strict 
accountability would be established. Some, of course, 
would not respond. This mechanism would be useful in 
identifying those individuals, and reserving our most 
expensive options for them. 
A bifurcated system would be forseeably necessary where 
the counselling and legal monitoring functions are split 
to avoid the inevitable conflicts that arise. This ap-
proach has been used successfully in some treatment 
settings and could be applied in the management of high 
numbers of individuals. 
The proposed strategy outlined above should not be viewed 
as a "solution" to the drug problem. It does not deal with un-
derlying societal problems. It does not address the critical need 
for more and better treatment, more education, greater resourc-
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es. It does suggest that we are presently missing an opportuni-
ty to exert meaningful control over that segment of drug users 
that is most problematic--those drug abusers found in the crim-
inal justice system. 
The technology is here today to put this approach into 
effect. While legal issues must be carefully addressed, it must 
be remembered that we are talking about a population already 
under the jurisdiction of the court. Implementation of such a 
program would be difficult, but certainly not impossible. While 
it would be expensive, let us not lose sight of the fact that it 
would be more cost effective than any of the alternatives, in-
cluding the alternative of doing nothing. 
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